Former U.S. president Bill Clinton met with North Korea`s top leader, Kim Jong-il, on August 4, during an overnight stay in Pyongyang to obtain the release of two American journalists, who had been detained there for nearly five months on charges of trespassing. According to the North Korean Central News Agency, Clinton conveyed a “verbal message” from U.S. President Barack Obama to Kim, chairman of the North`s National Defense Commission, and “candid and in-depth discussions on wide-ranging issues of common interests” were conducted.
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, wife of the former president, repeatedly stated that negotiations for the release of the two journalists and North Korea`s nuclear issue were “totally” different. It is true, as cited by the secretary, that there are many hurdles to nuclear talks between North Korea and the United States. However, Clinton`s trip to Pyongyang was personally approved by Obama, whose verbal message to Kim presumably contained references to issues other than the journalists` release.
Obama dispatched the highest ranking personality Washington can afford to Pyongyang. Whatever may be Washington`s official explanations, the meeting between Clinton and Kim signaled that the two countries have practically begun to have direct talks since North Korea conducted its second nuclear test and test-fired long-range missiles. It is just a matter of time that North Korea and the United States will formally open bilateral negotiations.
The Clinton-Kim meeting recalls the 1994 visit to Pyongyang by another former U.S. president, Jimmy Carter. During the visit made at the height of the North`s first nuclear crisis, Carter met with then North Korean president Kim Il-sung. The removal of U.S. sanctions against the communist state and a summit between North and South Korea were among the issues discussed.
Although it managed to ease tension for a while, Carter`s visit failed to touch on fundamental issues. The North`s subsequent nuclear tests and behavior as a nuclear power explain concerns about Clinton`s trip. That is, whether the visit would repeat the bitter past experience of having been outwitted by North Korea with pending issues left unsettled.
To be frank, upon learning of Clinton`s sudden visit to Pyongyang, many people must have been perplexed and even felt betrayed by the United States. However, the turn of events is simply a manifestation of the hard reality that the dynamics of international politics essentially boils down to the pursuit of each country`s national interests. We South Koreans, instead of being agitated by an alteration of joy and disappointment, should look more realistically and dispassionately at evolving changes in the international situation.
What Washington fears most is the trafficking of North Korea`s nuclear technology to terrorist organizations hostile to the United States. The removal of this potential danger is the top U.S. priority. It is needless to ask what option Washington would take if its national interest clashes with South Korea`s position.
Clinton`s Pyongyang visit has clearly revealed the limits in effectively using sanctions against North Korea via the United Nations. In dealing with vital issues related to our nation`s destiny, such as North Korea`s nuclear ambition, we should harbor no illusion about the United Nations` authority and competence. So long as China is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, North Korean sanctions engineered by the world organization would be useless. Still, it is inconceivable to resort to war to make Pyongyang submissive.
It is widely expected that, regardless of format, the United States and North Korea will eventually enter bilateral negotiations, which would include the North`s nuclear program and the question of the Korean peninsula as a whole. The latter would involve replacement of the existing armistice agreement of the Korean War with a peace treaty and the fate of U.S. forces stationed in Korea.
One cannot rule out the possibility that in a few years Obama himself may visit Pyongyang for a summit. In this rapprochement scenario, North Korea would try to marginalize the voice of South Korea. This maneuver was seen in the 1994 U.S.-North Korean talks in Geneva for a nuclear agreement; South Korea was sidestepped and had to rely on smattering information. In the case of Clinton`s tour to the North as well, Seoul seems to have received advance notice without prior consultation.
It is undeniable that South Korea has the greatest stake in the Korean peninsula issues. Any decision made without the participation of South Korea cannot but be ruled null and void. If that premise is assured, there is no reason why we should not welcome either negotiations or a summit between the United States and North Korea aimed at guaranteeing the North‘s denuclearization and a genuine peace on the peninsula. Indeed, we need such a broad-minded and bold posture. However, if the process or outcome of any Washington-Pyongyang talks is either to affirm North Korea`s nuclear program as a fait accompli or leads to instability and destruction on this peninsula, we must resolutely cope with such developments and consequences.
In question is what sort of measures we have at our disposal. The government needs to assure the public that it is properly prepared to meet all circumstances, including worst-case scenarios. Essential above all is a firm national integration that paves the way for specific and effective diplomatic strategies.
When Carter visited Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung told him, “We have neither intention nor capability to pursue nuclear development.” Twelve years later, the North conducted its first nuclear test. At that time, Robert Gallucci, who had negotiated a nuclear accord with North Korea, confided that Washington had been “completely cheated.” Lest Clinton`s visit to Pyongyang turn out to be a replica of the disaster, we have to closely watch the journey`s aftermath and forthcoming changes with an open-minded but cool-headed stance.
[ August 5, 2009 ]